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The Australian contribution to the 
United Nations Force in Cyprus
Nikos Christodoulides
this paper, based on Australian sources, aims to examine the logic behind Australia’s 
decision to contribute a police unit in the united Nations Force in Cyprus (uNFiCYP) 
in 1964. it offers answers to questions such as: What was the first reaction in Canberra 
to the uN request for troops contribution in the uNFiCYP? What were Australia’s 
major reservations? What were the decisive factors that led to the re-examination of 
Canberra’s first reaction and its final decision? 
Background to the Study
in November 1963, the President of the republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios 
proposed thirteen points for the amendment of the Constitution of the republic, to 
the turkish Cypriot Vice President of the republic, dr Fazil kutchuk. the proposal 
was rejected by the turkish Government and in december 1963, after an insignificant 
incident in the capital of Cyprus, intercommunal fighting broke out on the island. 
the situation in Cyprus and the turkish threat of military intervention, led the Brit-
ish Government, with the support of Washington, to call a conference in london, 15 
January 1964, to discuss the situation. in the meantime, approximately four thousand 
British troops, with the agreement of the republic of Cyprus, Greece and turkey, 
undertook — temporarily — the role of a peace keeping force on the island, until a 
permanent solution could be found (or so it was hoped), at the london conference. 
At the conference, the real effort of the British and the American Governments was 
the stabilization of the situation in Cyprus and the avoidance of a Greco-turkish war 
which would have caused serious problems for the cohesion of NAto in the Mediter-
ranean. in the calling of the conference, london and Washington had also anticipated 
sidetracking the intention of the republic of Cyprus to appeal to the united Nations 
security Council (uNsC). such an appeal would have caused the situation in Cyprus 
to be discussed and would have also lead to a request for the establishment of a uN 
peace keeping force in Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 2007; Clerides, 1988). As described in a 
memorandum to the Australian Minister of external Affairs, london and Washington 
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were “reluctant to have a uN force created, as this would unnecessarily internationalise 
the (Cyprus) issue by opening up the issue to debate in the uN where Archbishop 
Makarios (could) count on widespread soviet bloc and Afro-Asian support”.1 
Thus, at the london conference, an Anglo-American plan was proposed to Greek 
Cypriots, a plan for creating a NAto peacekeeping force for Cyprus that would sta-
bilise the situation on the island. The idea of establishing a NAto peacekeeping force 
was immediately rejected by Makarios, who was in favour of a peacekeeping force in 
Cyprus that would be under uN control. The opposition of Makarios to the creation 
of a NAto force and the British and American insistence in favour of it, were among 
the causes of the collapse of the london conference and the beginning of a discussion 
of the situation in Cyprus at the uNsC.
however, before the collapse of the conference, the British, afraid that Makarios 
would not accept the Anglo-American proposal for a NAto peacekeeping force for 
Cyprus, secretly approached a number of western oriented Commonwealth coun-
tries to examine an alternative: the possibility of sending troops to Cyprus as part of 
a Commonwealth peacekeeping force. The British were encouraged to examine the 
possibility of a Commonwealth force because, during the conference, Greek Cypriots 
had not excluded (indeed had indirectly proposed) the formation of a Commonwealth 
peacekeeping force for Cyprus. The logic behind the Cypriot stance was based on their 
desire to avoid the creation of a NAto peacekeeping force. however, for the British, 
this opened up the way for a compromise alternative to the establishment of both 
a NAto and a uN force.2 This alternative would be activated, in the event that the 
Anglo-American plan might fail, because of the reluctance of the republic of Cyprus 
to accept such a peacekeeping force.
it is in this context that the British approached Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; 
for this same force they also approached ireland and considered india. 
in this paper, in the main, the Australian dimension of these contacts, which led 
to the first ever participation of Australians in a uN peacekeeping mission, will be 
examined.
The first reaction in Canberra
The British first approached the Australians in the beginning of February 1964. A 
note from the British high Commission in Canberra, to the Australian department 
of external Affairs, requested that Australia contribute troops for the projected force 
and stated that “the scale of participation which the British Government (had) in 
mind (was) a battalion each from Canada and Australia, (with) a token contribution 
1 Memorandum from First Assistant secretary to the Minister for external Affairs, file no. 152/2/1, Part 
2, 31 January 1964.
2 telegram from the British high Commission in Canberra to the Australian department of external 
Affairs, “international Force for Cyprus”, 11 February 1964, file no. C3924.
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from New Zealand”.3 The British emphasised to Australia “the absolute secrecy” of 
their request, because they did not want “Makarios to believe [that] there [was] an 
alternative to the Anglo-American proposals”, namely, the establishment of a NAto 
peacekeeping force.4 
The British request was first discussed by the Australian Joint Planning Commit-
tee which in its report to the defence Committee, presented the case from a military 
point of view. The issues at hand, as the Committee saw it, were the availability of 
troops, training issues, Australia’s obligations in Malaysia, and Australian commit-
ments in the southeast Asia treaty organization.5 The issue was further discussed, 
13 February 1964, by the defence Committee (composed of representatives of the 
department of defence, the Military, the treasury department and the department 
of external Affairs). in the meantime, the department of external Affairs expressed 
itself in favour of the British request. According to its representative, participation 
could only benefit Australia. By sending troops to Cyprus, Australia would
a) improve its standing in international affairs; 
b) be appreciated by the us; 
c) relieve pressure on both the uk and the us for Australia to make further 
force contributions in the southeast Asian area; 
d) assist the British who had worldwide force commitments; 
e) contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Cyprus:
The large British forces which were in Cyprus could be released to assist 
Malaysia and as a result, reduce the pressure for Australian assistance if 
the situation worsened there.6 
The representatives of the Ministry of defence and of the Military were against 
the participation of Australian troops in a peacekeeping force in Cyprus. The reasons 
given were: 
a) Australia’s obligations in southeast Asia had a higher strategic priority than 
participation in a peacekeeping mission in Cyprus;
b) The available Australian forces that could be sent to Cyprus would not make 
a substantial contribution to such a peacekeeping force.7 
The different views expressed in the defence Committee caused the issue to be 
sent, without recommendation, for consideration and final decision to the Australian 
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 Joint Planning Committee report No. 12/1964, 12 February 1964, file no. C3924.
6 Minute by the defence Committee at Meeting held on thursday, 13 February 1964, file no. C3924.
7 ibid.
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Cabinet. on 18 February, the Cabinet adopted the arguments of the Military and it 
was decided “that having regard to Australia’s present and potential military commit-
ments in the south-east Asian area, the Government was not willing to contribute 
forces towards peace-keeping in Cyprus”.8 
The Cyprus issue in the UN
on 10 February 1964 the london Conference collapsed and ten days later, the Cyprus 
issue was referred to the uN. on 22 February, just a few days after the negative decision 
of the Australian Government to the British request, the Australian Acting Permanent 
representative in the uN, informed Canberra of Makarios’ request for a uN peace-
keeping force in Cyprus. such a force would be composed of Commonwealth and 
Non Aligned countries. After instructions from the department of external Affairs, 
the Australian diplomat, in order to avoid a possible request from the uN secretariat 
for an Australian contribution to a peacekeeping force in Cyprus, informed the secre-
tary General (sG) of the uN, u Thant, of the British request and Australia’s negative 
response because of other commitments in south-east Asia.9 
in the uN, the Australians continued to monitor closely, the developments regard-
ing Cyprus. They were concerned that if a peacekeeping force for Cyprus was created, 
Australia would again be asked to contribute. They were right: a few days later, during a 
meeting of the Australian Acting Permanent representative in the uN with u Thant, 
the sG, the Australian diplomat was asked informally how Australia would react to a 
uN request for troops in a peacekeeping force in Cyprus. u Thant further “indicated 
that he intended to address such a request to the countries concerned, as soon as a 
resolution [on Cyprus] was adopted”.10
on 4 March 1964, the uNsC adopted resolution 186, recommending among 
others, “the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a uN peace-
keeping force in Cyprus”. it left decisions on the composition and size of this force 
to the sG, who would have to consult with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, 
turkey and the uk. The force would be called the united Nations Force in Cyprus 
(uNFiCYP).11
since the sG was aware of Canberra’s negative reaction to the earlier British request 
for troops in Cyprus, Australia was not among the first countries u Thant approached 
(after resolution 186 was adopted). The first group of countries approached, comprised 
8  Cabinet Minute, decision No. 45, “Cyprus”, 18 February 1964.
9 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 195, 22 
February 1964.
10 Memorandum from First Assistant secretary to the Minister, “Cyprus — Peacekeeping Force and 
Mediator”, 3 March 1964, file no. 913/5/Part 2.
11 resolution adopted by the security Council at its 1102nd Meeting on 4 March 1964, united Nations 
security Council, 8/5575.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Nikos Christodoulides
182
Canada, ireland, sweden, Finland and Brazil. u Thant requested a “battalion plus” 
from each, that would be added to the British component already in Cyprus.12 
in the meantime, the problem of financing the proposed force arose at the uN. 
on 10 March, the sG asked a number of countries, including Australia, for a volun-
tary contribution to the financing of uNFiCYP.13 Canberra immediately decided to 
reply positively. This decision was based on the logic that by providing a financial 
contribution, it was possible that Australia would not be asked to contribute troops. 
under instructions from the department of external Affairs, the Australian Mis-
sion in the uN, informed the uN secretariat that Australia would contribute fifty 
thousand Australian dollars.14 With disarming Australian frankness, the Australian 
Mission in the uN was also instructed to inform the uN secretariat that Australia 
“would not wish to be requested to provide troops for the uN operation in Cyprus”.15
on 27 March 1964, uNFiCYP became operational with the participation of the 
British, Canadians, swedish, Finish and irish. earlier on, lieutenant General Gyani, 
the first Commander of uNFiCYP, had pointed out the necessity for police officers 
in Cyprus. Gyani had asked for two hundred policemen, from the uNsG, for specific 
work that could not be done by the military personnel of uNFiCYP.16 According to 
the uN secretariat, the Congo experience had proved the importance of having a 
police force in a peacekeeping mission, since the four hundred Nigerian police who 
served in Congo, had “made a very effective and valuable contribution in stiffening 
and training the Congolese police by their own example of efficiency”.17 The main 
work of the uN police in Cyprus would consist of maintaining: 
a) constant liaison with Cypriot police; 
b) joint patrols with Cypriot police (particularly, for example, where Greek Cyp-
riot policemen might be investigating or checking on turkish Cypriots;
c) joint checkpoints; 
d) special investigations for which uNFiCYP’s personnel had no training. 
12 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 353, 4 
March 1964, file no. 152/10/1, Part 1.
13 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 269, 10 
March 1964, file no. 152/10/1, Part 1.
14 letter from the Acting Permanent representative of Australia to the uN to the uNsG, 13 March 1964, 
file no. 913/5, Part 2. Press release of the Australian Mission to the uN, 13 March 1964, file no. 913/5, 
Part 2.
15 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian Mission to the uN, no. 217, 13 
March 1964, file no. 152/10/1, Part 1. telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department 
of external Affairs, no. 291, 13 March 1964, file no. 152/10/1, Part 1.
16 For the uN Aide Memoire concerning Gyani’s request for two hundred police personnel for uNFiCYP 
and what police’s main task would be, see the telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the 
department of external Affairs, no. 401, 14 April 1964, file no. 152/2/1, Part 4.
17 ibid.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
the AustrAliAN CoNtriButioN to the uNited NAtioNs ForCe iN CYPrus
183
An additional reason for the creation of a police force in Cyprus, as part of the uNFi-
CYP, was that following the 1963 events on the island, all turkish Cypriot police offic-
ers withdrew from the bi-communal Cypriot police and, as a result, civilian problems 
between Greek Cypriots and turkish Cypriots caused further problems that required 
police intervention.18 in this context, on April 7, the uNsG asked the Australian Gov-
ernment to consider providing forty Australian police officers for the uNFiCYP.19 
The request of the sG, to Australia, was for ten police officers, ten sergeants and 
twenty constables.20 similar requests for police officers were also made to Finland 
(negative reply, claiming insufficient numbers of english-speaking personnel), ireland 
(negative reply because of unavailability of numbers), and the uk (negative reply, based 
on concern about sending British policemen, associated closely in Greek Cypriot minds 
with the recent eokA struggle in Cyprus).21 Canada, already contributing troops to 
the uNFiCYP, considered the request and rejected it. Austria, sweden and denmark 
replied positively, but New Zealand initially rejected the request. 
Australia’s major reservations
The first reaction from the Australian Mission to the uN, to this sG request, was that 
it would be difficult for the country to meet his request since “most police in Australia 
were those of the states”.22 however the request was forwarded to Canberra.
on 9 April 1964, the Australian Government, after consideration of the issue by 
the relevant Ministers and the Attorney General, decided (again) to reply negatively 
to the uN request. The decision was based on the fact that the Australian Federal 
Government itself could “not dispose of any large police force from which a contingent 
could be drawn”, while “the resources of the various Australian state Police Forces 
(were) overtaxed and it would be extremely difficult to obtain the number of personnel 
required”. Furthermore, the Government believed that “even if the numbers could be 
found, a contingent would not comprise a homogeneous force, readily assimilable into 
a uN force in Cyprus”.23 it is worth mentioning that in the discussions for examin-
ing the request of the sG, the diplomats in the department of external Affairs were 
again in favour of a positive reply, stating reasons relevant to the international role 
18 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 380, 7 April 
1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1. 
19 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 375, 7 April 
1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
20 ibid.
21 telegram from the Australian high Commission in london to the department of external Affairs, no. 
2199, 8 April 1964, file no. 152/2/1, Part 4.
22 telegram from Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 380, 7 April 
1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1. 
23 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian Mission to the uN, no. 271 and 
to Australian high Commission in london, no. 1762, 9 April 1964, file no. 152/2/1, Part 4.
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of the country. however, the Government did not share their concerns, adopting the 
argument of the scarcity of human resources.24
Four days later, on 13 April 1964, the Canadian Minister for external Affairs con-
tacted, personally, the head of the Australian Mission to the uN ( given that the Minis-
ter was away on a visit to the Philippines) “to urge that Australia reconsider its decision 
not to contribute police to [the] uN force” in Cyprus.25 According to the relevant 
telegram from the Australian Mission, the Canadian Minister expressed a desire “to 
impress on the Australian Government his own very strong feelings on the desirability 
of broadening the basis of the international effort in respect of Cyprus”.26 The Canadian 
Minister also claimed that a positive Australian reply to the secretary General’s request 
for a police contribution, to the uNFiCYP, would have a “tremendous effect” and would 
influence other countries to reply positively. This approach to Australia was caused by 
internal Canadian concerns. Canadian opposition parties were claiming at the time 
“that Canada is already providing more than her fair share in Cyprus and that other 
uN members, able to do so, should be asked to make a contribution”.27
The Canadian request led to the re-examination of Australia’s position. A decisive 
factor for this development was, of course, the fact that the Canadian Minister him-
self had asked this, driven by his argument concerning the necessity of broadening 
the international base of the peacekeeping effort in Cyprus. Furthermore, there was 
the argument that no other countries were in a position to provide police officers, 
since they would have to be fluent english speakers, white and non Muslim. Finally, 
however, the Australian Mission to the uN opted in favour of supplying, “a very small 
police contribution”.28 it is important to note that in the process of re-examining 
its position, Australia asked london and Washington for their ideas regarding the 
possibility of sending Australian policemen to Cyprus. Australia also sought their 
views regarding the usefulness and the prospects regarding the creation of such a 
force.29 london and Washington encouraged the Australians to reply positively to the 
Canadian request.30 At the same time turkey approached Canberra to inform it that 
24 Memorandum from the uN Branch, department of external Affairs, “Provision of Australian Police for 
Cyprus Force”, 8 April 1964, file no. 152/10/1, Part 1. Memorandum from the uN Branch, department 
of external Affairs, “uN secretary General’s request for forty Australian Police for Cyprus”, 9 April 1964, 
file no. 152/10/1, Part 1.
25 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 395, 13 
April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
26 ibid.
27 telegram from the Australian high Commission in ottawa to the department of external Affairs, no. 
119, 13 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
28 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 400, 14 
April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
29 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian high Commission in london, no. 
1859 and Australian embassy in Washington, no. 1013, 15 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
30 telegram from the Australian embassy in Washington to the department of external Affairs, no. 1089, 
15 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1. telegram from the Australian high Commission in london to 
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its contribution would be welcomed by turkey, because “it would give the turkish 
authorities some confidence in the effectiveness and objectivity of the police force”.31 
it is worth mentioning that the Canadian request for the re-examination of Austral-
ian’s position, concerning a contribution in the police force in Cyprus, was followed, 
a few days later, by a second request from u Thant.32
Decisive factors that led to the final decision 
on 22 April 1964, the Australian Minister for external Affairs, submitted a Memo-
randum in favour of contributing policemen to the uNFiCYP, for consideration by 
the Cabinet. 
Among the main points were:
a) Australia’s argument for rejecting its participation with troops in uNFiCYP 
(strategic commitments in south east Asia) did not apply to non-military 
personnel;
b) the validity of the Canadian argument for broadening the international base 
of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus;
c) Australia’s participation that would enhance its reputation as a leading and 
responsible supporter of the principles of the united Nations;
d) the positive outcomes for Australia given that Australia had much to gain by 
establishing the principle that, in any uN peace-keeping operation, countries 
with specific interest should, if possible, be excluded;
e) the benefits for Australia given that Australia had a motive for assisting the 
British, namely, that of maintaining the interest and effort of the uk in Com-
monwealth countries of greater concern to Canberra, like Malaysia;
f) the need for Australia to demonstrate its practical willingness to support 
principles and decisions of the uN because, in the event that the Malaysia 
issue were to be brought before the uN, Australia would need the full sup-
port of the uN.33 
the department of external Affairs, no. 2376, 15 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
31 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 407, 15 
April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
32 telegram from the Australian Mission to the uN to the department of external Affairs, no. 410, 16 
April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 2.
33 Memorandum from the Minister for external Affairs to the Cabinet, “uN Force in Cyprus. Provision 
of Australian Police”, submission no. 151, 22 April 1964, file no. C 3924. see also Notes on Cabinet 
submission no. 151, 22 April 1964, file no. C 3924.
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The proposal from the Minister for external Affairs was approved by the Cabinet 
on 23 April 1964. 
The Cabinet decision cited the following reasons for its positive reply:
a) the important peace keeping role that needed to be exercised;
b) the suggestions from the us and other important Western countries that 
Australia should contribute if possible;
c) the desirability that Australia, being in many instances an “asking” country 
in international; 
d) relations matters, should contribute where it could make a contribution.34
The next day, the Attorney General began negotiations with the state Govern-
ments for the establishment of an Australian police force of forty persons to be sent 
to Cyprus. relevant letters to the Premiers of several states were sent by the Prime 
Minister, informing them of the decision of the Government and asking for their 
cooperation.35 This led to a Conference organised in Melbourne, on 30 April 1964, 
for the discussion of these issues, with the states.36
on 1 May 1964, the uNsG was informed that “the Australian Government (had) 
undertaken to try to comply with his request to contribute a detachment of forty 
police for service in Cyprus with the uNFiCYP”.37 The official announcement in the 
house of representatives was made by the Minister for external Affairs on 6 May 
1964. The forty Australian police officers comprised ten from New south Wales, ten 
from Victoria, and five each from Queensland, and south Australia. in addition, the 
number included officers from the Commonwealth police force, three from Western 
Australia and two from tasmania.38 The Australian police contingent arrived in Cyprus 
on 25 May 1964. Forty five years later, Australia continues to maintain an unbroken 
commitment to the uNFiCYP (horner, londey, Bou, 2009:153–54). The Australian 
police contingent, numbering fifteen officers, is still in Cyprus.
Discussion of the Cyprus Issue
This paper has demonstrated that Australia did not really wish to become directly 
involved in the Cyprus issue, particularly since it did not have any special interest in 
34 Cabinet Minute, decision No. 170, 23 April 1964, file no. C 3924.
35 see for example the letter of the Australian Prime Minister robert Menzies to the Premier of south 
Australian sir thomas Playford, 24 April 1964, file no. C 3924.
36 Press release, “request from uN”, statement by the Attorney-General, 30 April 1964, file no. C 3924.
37 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian Mission to the uN, no. 326, 1 May 
1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 2.
38 “Australian Participation in uN Police Force in Cyprus”, statement by the Minister for external Affairs 
in the house of representatives, 6 May 1964, file no. 913/5, Part 3.
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the region. The discussions in Canberra, following the British request for the issue of 
a troops contribution in a peacekeeping force in Cyprus, shows that even though the 
Australian Government wanted to help the British to cope with the difficult situation 
in Cyprus, in the end, the decision was negative. The matter that weighed strongly 
in the Cabinet conclusions was that Australia did not have an interest in the eastern 
Mediterranean.39 This is precisely the opposite argument put forward by the Military, 
namely, “that Australia’s obligations in the southeast Asia had a higher strategic pri-
ority than a peacekeeping mission in Cyprus”.40 This Military stance represents the 
argument adopted in lieu of the arguments put forward by the Australian department 
of external Affairs. The Australian diplomats, for their part, and largely for reasons 
not directly connected with Cyprus, supported sending a token contribution to the 
uNFiCYP. Their main arguments for that were that such a gesture would improve 
Australia’s standing in international affairs and would be appreciated by the us. simi-
larly, it would relieve pressure on both the uk and the us, if Australia were to make 
further force contributions in the southeast Asian area.41
on the issue of the police contribution, again the decision was initially negative, 
despite the opposite recommendation of the department of external Affairs.42 As was 
shown above, the eventual re-examination of the issue and the decision to contribute 
forty police officers, was a political decision decisively influenced by the personal 
approach of the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs.43 As was the case with the 
troops contribution in the uNFiCYP, so here, the arguments had little to do with the 
situation in Cyprus. The Cabinet’s decision to send police officers to Cyprus was based 
on the Australian perception of its role as peace keeper and the importance attached 
to approaches from the us (the “leader” of the Western World) and Canada (with 
whom Australia maintained close cooperation). in addition, there was the importance 
of Australia maintaining a positive role in uN issues.44 None of these reasons carry 
any reference to the Cyprus issue itself. it is worth mentioning that among the argu-
ments of the department of external Affairs for contributing police officers to the 
uNFiCYP, not one ever referred to the role Australians could play in Cyprus itself. 
The closest that discussions ever got to Cyprus was through a vague reference to the 
negative effects the “troubles” in Cyprus could have for NAto and the West.45
39 Cabinet Minute, decision No. 45, “Cyprus”, 18 February 1964.
40 Minute by the defence Committee at Meeting held on thursday, 13 February 1964, file no. C3924.
41 ibid.
42 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian Mission to the uN, no. 271 and 
to Australian high Commission in london, no. 1762, 9 April 1964, file no. 152/2/1, Part 4.
43 telegram from the Australian high Commission in ottawa to the department of external Affairs, no. 
119, 13 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 1.
44 Memorandum from the Minister for external Affairs to the Cabinet, “uN Force in Cyprus. Provision 
of Australian Police”, submission no. 151, 22 April 1964, file no. C 3924. see also Notes on Cabinet 
submission no. 151, 22 April 1964, file no. C 3924 and Cabinet Minute, decision No. 170, 23 April 
1964, file no. C 3924.
45 ibid.
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A component of Australian foreign policy that emerges from the above is the prior-
ity, indeed need, for cooperation and collaboration with Canada and New Zealand and 
the special weight attached to requests from these two countries. From the study of the 
Australian archives for 1964, it is worth mentioning that Canberra always informed 
and exchanged ideas with ottawa and Wellington and each country was, in turn, 
influenced by the position of the other two. As already presented above, it was Canada’s 
request that swung Australia’s decision, regarding the issue of whether to contribute 
police officers to the uNFiCYP. likewise, New Zealand followed Australia, on this 
issue of providing police for the uNFiCYP, one day after the former did so: it is argued 
that the Australian decision not to contribute is one of the reasons for New Zealand’s 
own negative reply.46 When Australia decided to reconsider the issue of sending police 
forces to Cyprus, again New Zealand likewise decided to do the same.47 Furthermore, 
when the Australians finally decided to send police to Cyprus, they approached the 
Canadians for a special briefing on Cyprus matters such as logistics, transport and 
appropriate channels of communication. Australian planning was totally reliant on 
Canadian facilities for dealing with emergencies in Cyprus.48
The study of the Australian archives on the issue of the Australian contribution 
to the uN force in Cyprus also highlighted the different approaches to international 
issues that were evident twixt the diplomats and the military. As stated in a memo-
randum to the Prime Minister “The study of the British enquiry has so far revealed a 
cleavage of views. external (parties) are in favour, defence (forces) oppose. external 
influences support, in the main, the issue of Australia’s Commonwealth and interna-
tional standing whereas defence issues are fully focused on the question of availability 
of personnel and possible commitments nearer home”.49 however, this is possibly 
expected, given the roles of each department.
Finally, the analysis has shown the insistence of both the uN secretariat and the 
British, on contributions to the uNFiCYP from certain countries, like Canada, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. This development would appear to be due to the fact that 
these three countries, even though they were considered part of the Western World, 
46 the other two reasons were “reluctance to become involved in the most difficult aspect of the Cyprus 
situation (police duties) and the real shortage of police in New Zealand”, telegram from the Australian 
high Commission in Wellington to the department of external Affairs, no. 264, 10 April 1964, file no. 
152/2/1, Part 4.
47 in a telegram from Wellington, the Australian high Commissioner mentioned that “in view of renewed 
request from sG, Canadian pressure and Australian reconsideration, New Zealand external affairs and 
police commissioner intend recommending to Cabinet that the New Zealand police be made available”. 
New Zealand finally sent twenty police officers. telegram from the Australian high Commission in 
Wellington to the department of external Affairs, no. 254, 22 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 2.
48 telegram from the department of external Affairs to the Australian high Commission in ottawa, no. 
136, 30 April 1964, file no. 152/9/1/, Part 2, and telegram from the Australian high Commission in 
ottawa to the department of external Affairs, no. 138, 1 May 1964, file no. 152/9/1, Part 2.
49 Memorandum from Acting secretary to the Prime Minister, “Cyprus–Australian contribution to 
Commonwealth peace-keeping force”, Prime Minister’s department, 17 February 1964, file no. C 3924.
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were not seen as part of the “hard core” of the Western Alliance. to this end, their 
participation in a peace keeping force in Cyprus was welcomed not only by the uN, 
the British, the us and turkey, but also by Makarios who opposed the participation of 
hard core NAto members from Western countries, in the uNFiCYP (Coufoudakis, 
2007; Clerides, 1988). At the same time, Australia, Canada and New Zealand were not 
directly involved in the Cyprus issue and as a result it was much easier for them to be 
trusted by the parties involved in the crises. Finally, as we saw, the insistence on the 
participation of contingents from these three countries was also due to other reasons, 
with one key reason being that the uNsG had also been trying to find officers who 
were fluent english-speakers, White and non Muslim.
Concluding Comment
This paper has demonstrated that countries may well decide to participate in uN 
missions for reasons not related to the area concerned or the purpose of the mission 
itself. There is no doubt that in 1964, Australia decided to participate in the uNFi-
CYP for reasons not necessarily related to Cyprus or the goal of the uN to create 
a peacekeeping force on the island. however, one needs to also note that forty five 
years after the decision of the Australian Government to send a police contingent to 
Cyprus, fifteen Australian police officers are still on the island, whilst all other police 
contingents, from other countries, who went to Cyprus in 1964, withdrew from the 
uNFiCYP. This may well show us that Australia has developed a genuine interest in 
the Cyprus problem.
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